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REAL EXCHANGE RATE SHOCKS, ASYMMETRIC ADJUSTMENT AND LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM 
IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the possibility that long-run relative purchasing power parity is 
dependent upon the nature of real exchange shocks that are experienced. While existing 
studies involving developed and less developed countries often find against purchasing power 
parity having employed linear tests of non-stationarity or non-cointegration, we employ a 
new cointegration test, recently advocated by Enders and Siklos and Enders and Dibooglu, 
that tests for an asymmetric adjustment towards parity with respect to positive and negative 
real exchange rate shocks. Using a sample of ten African economies with data taken from the 
post-Bretton Woods floating exchange rate era, long-run purchasing power parity holds in 
eight of these cases if an explicit distinction is made between positive and negative shocks. 
Across the sample, we find variation in the type of asymmetry experienced and the roles 
played price and nominal exchange rate adjustment.  
 
JEL Codes: C5, F3, F4. 
 
1. Introduction 
Policy makers in less developed countries (LDCs) have a potential interest in purchasing 
power parity (PPP) for a number of reasons. First, PPP becomes a prediction model for 
exchange rates and a criterion for judging over- and undervaluation of currencies. This may 
be particularly relevant for small open economies and those experiencing large inflation 
differentials between domestic and foreign inflation rates. Second, many exchange rate 
theories employ some notion of PPP in their construction. Thus the quality of policy advice, 
insofar as it is based on these theories, may depend on the validity of PPP. However, the 
evidence on PPP for developed countries and LDCs has generally provided ambiguous results 
without a conclusive answer, for example Balassa (1964) and Hakkio (1984) find in favor of 
PPP while Dornbusch (1980) and Frenkel (1981) find no evidence in favor of PPP. However, 
Frenkel (1978) suggests that PPP holds during periods of high inflation. More specific 
evidence concerning LDCs is also mixed [see, inter alia, McNown and Wallace (1989), Liu 
(1992), Bahmani-Oskooee (1993), Mahdavi and Zhou (1994), Holmes (2001), Nagayasu 
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(2002)]. In terms of methodology, the recent studies of long-run PPP in LDCs have utilised 
augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests for unit roots in real exchange rates and cointegration 
between various measures of domestic and foreign prices and nominal exchange rates. 
Typically, the null of non-stationarity or non-cointegration is accepted by the data and 
therefore purchasing power parity is rejected. The conclusions drawn for LDCs in these 
studies are primarily based on linear tests for stationarity or cointegration.1 However, 
evidence of asymmetries in key economic variables has been established for developed 
economies in recent years. For example, Ramsey and Rothman (1996) and Verbrugge (1998) 
identify asymmetries in inflation and attribute them to downward price rigidities. Cover 
(1992), Rhee and Rich (1995), Karras (1996) and Madsen and Yang (1998) offer more 
general empirical evidence that corroborates the implications of price adjustment models 
where prices are primarily sticky in a downward direction. Studies by van Dijk and Franses 
(1997), Enders and Granger (1998), Enders and Siklos (1999) find evidence in asymmetries 
in nominal interest rates while Coakley and Fuertes (2002) consider real interest rates. Enders 
and Dibooglu (2001) identify asymmetries in OECD real exchange adjustment towards PPP. 
Since the vast majority of the existing work on PPP in LDCs is based on linear tests for 
mean-reversion in real exchange rates, no allowance is made for the type of shock (positive 
or negative) that is experienced.  
This paper offers an important contribution to the PPP debate by considering whether 
long-run PPP holds for LDCs against a background of asymmetric responses to positive and 
negative real exchange rate shocks. When considering the long-run adjustment towards PPP, 
one can point to the presence of transactions costs that inhibit international goods arbitrage, 
product markets that are characterised by extensive government intervention through 
                                                 
1 In an attempt to overcome low test power, the studies by Holmes (2001) and Nagayasu (2002) employ (linear) 
panel data unit root and cointegration tests. Whereas these studies identify PPP for various LDC panels as a 
whole, there is little evidence to suggest that anything more than a few countries are responsible for rejecting the 
nulls of non-stationarity or non-cointegration. 
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taxation, price setting and public trading monopolies [Collier and Gunning (1999)] and the 
reluctance of central banks to facilitate depreciation of the nominal exchange rate in a regime 
of managed floating [Hossain and Chowdhury (1998)]. These factors may be relevant to how 
real exchange rate adjustment responds to positive and negative shocks.2 Using quarterly data 
for the period 1973Q2 to 2002Q1, ten African countries are analysed using a new test for 
asymmetric adjustment towards PPP advocated by Enders and Siklos (2001) and Enders and 
Dibooglu (2001). Our analysis indicates that PPP is confirmed where the speed of adjustment 
towards equilibrium depends on the nature of the shock that the economy experiences.  
 The paper is organised as follows. The following section describes the nature of 
asymmetries in adjustment towards PPP and the methodological approach. This approach 
enables us to formally test for cointegration distinguishing between the roles played by 
positive and negative real exchange rate shocks. The third section describes the data. The 
fourth section discusses the results and the final section concludes.  
 
2. Cointegration, Asymmetric Adjustment and PPP 
Let the natural logarithm of the domestic price index (p) be and determined in the long-run as 
tttt epp µβββ +++= 2*10         (1) 
where *p  is the natural logarithms of the foreign price index, e is the nominal exchange rate 
measured as the domestic price of foreign currency and µ  is the error term. For a number of 
reasons the use of this estimating equation is appropriate for testing relative rather than 
absolute long-run PPP. First, empirical studies of PPP typically employ data on price indices 
rather than price levels. Price indices contain base periods where the nominal exchange rate 
can equal the price ratio by construction. Therefore, a test for a unit root in tµ  is in fact a test 
                                                 
2 In addition to this, the presence of asymmetries in real exchange rates can be attributed to the heterogeneity of 
participants in the foreign exchange market in terms of agents’ expectations formation or investors’ objectives 
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for a unit root in the change from base period. This is the usual test of long-run relative PPP 
in the literature arguing that the percentage change in the nominal spot exchange rate should 
equal the inflation differential between country i  and the base country.3 Second, the actual 
exchange rate may deviate from its parity value on account of imperfections in published 
prices indices (for example, in reality the price indices of different countries do not reflect the 
same basket of goods). Third, deviations from absolute PPP may occur on account of 
transport costs, tariffs and differential speeds of adjustment in the goods and foreign 
exchange markets. Assessing relative PPP allows for any constant of proportion based on 
these factors that drives a wedge between tp  and 
*
tt pe + . For these reasons, we do not 
impose the strict conditions 00 =β , 11 =β  and 12 =β  but a priori we would expect 01 >β  
and 02 >β . The usual test for linear adjustment towards PPP is based assessing the unit root 
properties of tµ  through the estimation of  
t
k
i
ititt εµψρµµ ∑
=
−− +∆+=∆
1
1        (2) 
where tε  is a white noise residual. However, the adjustment towards PPP may in fact be 
asymmetric and can be justified on a number of grounds. For a given country, suppose there 
is positive shock to PPP with 0>tµ  in equation (1) that represents a decline in 
competitiveness. Adjustment back towards PPP can be achieved through a rise in e (nominal 
depreciation), an increase in *p , and/or a decrease in p. Conversely, a negative shock in 
equation (1) can be represented by 0<tµ  or an increase in competitiveness. This time, 
adjustment will require a decrease in e (nominal appreciation), a decrease in *p , and/or an 
increase in p. Agents in the economy may have different attitudes towards increases and 
decreases in e and p. For example, some central banks may view devaluations of the nominal 
                                                                                                                                                        
(see Sarantis (1999) and references contained therein). 
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exchange rate as being inflationary with no long-run beneficial effects on the real exchange 
rate.4 There may be political stigma attached to devaluation [see, for example, Aghevli et al. 
(1991)]. On the other hand, an overvalued nominal exchange rate may be seen as detrimental 
to the trade balance. In the case of price adjustment, there is the possibility of price controls 
or simply the relative downward rigidity with respect to p even in the absence of price 
controls. For these reasons, it is possible that the speed of adjustment back towards PPP 
depend on the sign of the shock to µ . When testing for cointegration and long-run PPP in 
equation (1), it therefore seems appropriate to explicitly distinguish between positive and 
negative real exchange rate shocks accordingly,  
tttttt II εµρµρµ +−+=∆ −− 1211 )1(        (3) 
where the stationarity of µ  is achieved where 0,2 21 <<− ρρ  and tI  is the Heaviside 
indicator with the following function 
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         (4) 
On the basis of the above arguments, we might expect 21 ρρ ≠ . In the case of goods market 
arbitrage, transactions costs may straddle the equilibrium value of PPP so that as one moves 
further away from central parity, arbitrage becomes feasible (see, inter alia, Obstfeld and 
Taylor (1997). We may therefore define a threshold (τ ) below which adjustment towards 
PPP will not occur. Making the appropriate adjustment to the Heaviside indicator means that  
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τµ
t
t
t if
if
I        (5) 
Finally, it might be necessary to include lags of tµ∆  to ensure that tε  is white noise.  
                                                                                                                                                        
3 See Crownover, Pippenger and Steigerwald (1996) for an elaboration on this point.  
4 Few studies have identified a long-run relationship between the nominal and real exchange rate of LDCs [see, 
inter alia, Connolly and Taylor (1976, 1979), Donovan (1981), Bautista (1981), Morgan and Davis (1982), 
Edwards (1988, 1994)]. However, recent evidence on LDCs from Bahmani-Oskooee and Miteza (2002) argues 
that devaluations of the nominal exchange rate do actually result in devaluations of the real exchange rate. 
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Enders and Dibooglu (2001) and Enders and Siklos (2001) also advocate testing for 
asymmetric cointegration using the momentum threshold autoregressive (MTAR) model. 
This requires the amendment of equation (5) so that 


<∆
≥∆=
−
−
.0
1
1
1
τµ
τµ
t
t
t if
if
I        (7) 
It is argued that this model is appropriate if µ  exhibits more momentum in one direction than 
another. Rather than adopt a methodology based on the application of smooth transition 
autoregressive (STAR) modelling to real exchange rate behaviour (see, for example, 
Terasvirta (1994) and Sarantis (1999)), this study investigates adjustment towards long-run 
PPP through the employment of a threshold cointegration approach. For the purposes of 
testing for asymmetries in a long-run cointegrating relationship, two tests are proposed. The 
first is the F-test for cointegration in equation (6) where the null is specified as 021 == ρρ  
and the test statistic is defined as µΦ . This test follows a non-standard distribution and we 
employ the critical values reported in Enders and Dibooglu (2001), Table 1. The second test 
focuses on the possibility of asymmetries within the cointegrating relationship and is on 
21 ρρ = . This is a standard F-test. The estimation of equation (6) requires the consistent 
estimation of τ . This is achieved through a grid search procedure for τ  where the boundaries 
are defined between the largest and smallest values of tµ . The chosen value for τ  is the one 
that minimises the residual sum of squares during the OLS estimation of (6).  
 
3. Data and Results 
The empirical analysis involves the following ten African countries: Botswana, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania. All 
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price and exchange rate data are taken from the International Financial Statistics database. 
The price series are based on the consumer price index (line 64) and the nominal exchange 
rate data are end of period spot rates with respect to the US dollar (domestic price of the U.S. 
dollar). Quarterly data for the period 1973Q2-2002Q2 provide a sample size of 117 
observations on each series for each country where the use of quarterly data is dictated by 
data availability across this large sample.5 The start of 1973 is consistent with Bahmani-
Oskooee (1993), Mahdavi and Zhou (1994) and Holmes (2001) in their investigations of PPP 
in LDCs and can be regarded as the start of modern “floating rate” period with respect to the 
US dollar. 
Table 1 reports the application of the Engle-Granger procedure to equations (1) and 
(2). For each country, the lag length k was selected using the Akaike Information Criteria 
(AIC). We are unable to reject the null of non-cointegration at the 10% significance level in 
all cases. As argued above, the general absence of long-run PPP in these initial tests might be 
attributable to the employment of linear tests for mean reversion whereas there are in fact 
asymmetries in any adjustment towards long-run PPP with respect to positive and negative 
shocks. Moreover, these tests for symmetric cointegration have low test power against a 
background of asymmetric adjustment. To accommodate this, we set the indicator function tI  
as shown in equations (5) for the TAR model and (7) for the MTAR model and estimate 
equation (6). Given the presence of measurement errors and/or adjustment costs, there is no 
reason to presume that the threshold is identically equal to zero. To estimate the threshold, we 
use the grid search method described above which provides a consistent estimate of the 
threshold. Table 2 reports the results. Using the AIC model selection criterion, the MTAR 
model is favored in the cases of Botswana, Burundi, Ivory Coast, and Morocco. A major 
difference from the results previously reported in Table 1 is that the case for cointegration 
                                                 
5 Data limitations prevent the use of wholesale price or effective exchange rate indices across all these 
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and long-run PPP is substantially strengthened when asymmetries are allowed for because in 
eight out of ten cases, asymmetric cointegration is now confirmed. The µΦ  statistic indicates 
that the null 021 == ρρ  is rejected at the 5% significance level or better and each of these 
cases and this is supported by the rejection of the null 21 ρρ = . In all cases except Cameroon, 
South Africa and Tanzania there is evidence that 21 ρρ >  implying that the speed of 
adjustment towards long-run relative PPP is faster in the case of a positive shock with respect 
to µ . The value of the estimated threshold τ , expressed as a percentage of the mean 
dependent variable, assumes a range of values. For most countries it is less than 3% though 
Nigeria and Tanzania are characterised by larger thresholds suggesting that adjustment 
towards PPP will only occur with respect to large shocks.  
The final part of our investigation is to estimate asymmetric error-correction models 
that are based on positive and negative shocks to equilibrium previously employed in the 
earlier results. The purpose of this procedure is to examine how the burden of adjustment 
towards long-run equilibrium is shared between the adjustment of domestic prices and the 
nominal exchange rate. Specifically, we estimate the following system of asymmetric error 
correction models for each country,  
−
−
+
−−−− ++∆+∆+∆= 112111113* 112111 )()()( tttttt zzeLApLApLAp ρρ   (8) 
−
−
+
−−−− ++∆+∆+∆= 122121123* 122121 )()()( tttttt zzeLApLApLAe ρρ   (9) 
−
−
+
−−−− ++∆+∆+∆= 132131133* 132131* )()()( tttttt zzeLApLApLAp ρρ   (10) 
where ttt Iz µ=+ , ttt Iz µ)1( −=− , tµ  is the residual from the long-run equation (1), tI is the 
indicator defined in the previous section, and )(LAij is a polynomial in the lag operator L. 
The choice of the appropriate lag length is based on the multivariate AIC. The choice of non-
zero threshold follows the same procedure outlined earlier. Table 3 reports the error-
                                                                                                                                                        
countries.  
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correction equations. In the cases of the Cameroon, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and 
Tanzania, 12ρ  is significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level or better. This 
is consistent with the upward adjustment of p in order to help facilitate the movement 
towards weak PPP in the event of a negative shock to µ  in equation (1) described above. In 
each of these countries, we also find that 11ρ  is insignificantly different from zero which is 
consistent with the downward rigidity of domestic prices that inhibits any move towards 
long-run equilibrium following a positive shock to µ . In the cases of the Egypt, Ivory Coast 
and Kenya, a different set of circumstances applies. The Ivory Coast and Kenya are 
characterised by 11ρ  rather than 12ρ  which is negative and significant. For these countries, 
domestic prices exhibit upward rather than downward price rigidity in any adjustment 
towards long-run PPP. In the case of Egypt, the emphasis is on nominal exchange rate 
adjustment because we find that both 11ρ  and 12ρ  are insignificantly different from zero and 
so domestic prices play no significant role in any adjustment. The results reported in Table 3 
highlight the more general role played by nominal exchange rate adjustment. We find that 
21ρ  is positive and significant in the cases of Egypt, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria and 
Tanzania where a positive shock to µ  and decline in competitiveness will result in a 
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. In the cases of Egypt and South Africa, 22ρ  is 
positive and significant indicating an appreciation of nominal exchange rate in the event of a 
negative shock to µ . However, the dynamics of nominal exchange rate adjustment are 
complex. With 21 21 << ρ  in the cases of Egypt and Tanzania, there is evidence of 
overshooting on the part of the nominal exchange rate in any adjustment towards PPP 
equilibrium. The t statistics indicate that 021 <ρ  in the case of Morocco and 022 <ρ  in the 
cases of the Cameroon, Morocco and Nigeria. Although asymmetric cointegration was 
confirmed earlier in Table 2, these results point to potentially destabilising behaviour on the 
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part of the nominal exchange rate. Governments may prefer to use the nominal exchange to 
protect any gains in competitiveness following a negative shock to PPP, or may be wary of 
allowing a nominal depreciation and any inflationary consequences following a positive 
shock to PPP. Finally, the estimates for 31ρ  and 32ρ  indicate that there is little in the way of 
*p  adjustment to facilitate long-run PPP. At the 5% significance level, we can only identify 
032 ≠ρ  in one case. This supports the view that the asymmetric adjustment towards long-run 
PPP relies on domestic prices and the nominal exchange rate rather than U.S. prices. 
 
4. Summary and Conclusion 
The majority of empirical work that addresses whether or not PPP holds in LDCs is based on 
linear tests for a long-run relationship between domestic prices, foreign prices and the 
nominal exchange rate. Most of these studies have been generally unsupportive of PPP. 
However, it can be argued that the sign of any disturbance to PPP is important with respect to 
any adjustment towards long-run equilibrium. Depending on upward and downward rigidities 
with respect to domestic prices and the nominal exchange rate, it is reasonable to argue that 
the speed of adjustment back towards long-run equilibrium will depend on the sign of shock. 
This paper explores the possibility of asymmetric adjustment towards long-run PPP for a 
sample of ten African countries over a thirty year study period. In answer to the question of 
whether or not long-run PPP holds in African countries, we find in favour of asymmetric 
PPP. Initial tests for linear cointegration are unable to find in favour of PPP. However, using 
a new test advocated by Enders and others, asymmetric cointegration is confirmed where the 
speed of adjustment back towards long-run equilibrium will depend on the whether the shock 
was positive or negative. Estimation of the error correction models indicates that most of the 
sample are characterised by downward price rigidity where domestic prices only respond to a 
negative real exchange rate shock. However, there is evidence that adjustment back towards 
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long-run equilibrium is shared between domestic prices and the nominal exchange rate. 
Avenues for future research might include country-specific investigations into the precise 
channels through which adjustment occurs following external shocks.  
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Table 1. Tests for Symmetric Cointegration 
Country 
0β  1β  2β  ADF 
Botswana -1.892 1.250 0.587 -1.959 
Burundi  -4.188 1.163 0.625 -2.359 
Cameroon -2.914 1.384 0.175 -2.921 
Egypt -4.221 1.776 0.459 -2.442 
Ivory Coast -2.801 1.368 0.166 -2.988 
Kenya -3.313 0.929 0.891 -3.019 
Morocco -1.531 1.268 0.105 -3.112 
Nigeria -6.086 1.956 0.602 -1.845 
South Africa -2.829 1.422 0.553 -2.004 
Tanzania -8.293 1.972 0.590 -1.885 
 
Notes. These results are based on the OLS estimation of equation (1) followed by ADF unit root tests defined in 
equation (2). 
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Table 2. Tests for Asymmetric Cointegration  
Country Model Γ  
1ρ  2ρ  µΦ a 21 ρρ =F b 
Botswana MTAR 0.000 -0.058 -0.120 3.128 0.707 
Burundi  MTAR 1.578 -0.091 -1.762 5.327 4.895** 
Cameroon TAR 1.576 -0.054 -0.238 7.729** 6.486** 
Egypt TAR 4.467 -0.586 -0.043 11.291*** 16.479*** 
Ivory Coast MTAR 1.903 -0.253 -0.022 10.793*** 11.734*** 
Kenya TAR 4.508 -0.729 -0.071 17.791*** 24.521*** 
Morocco MTAR 1.741 0.032 -0.121 8.250** 6.318** 
Nigeria TAR 23.766 -0.488 -0.026 17.771*** 28.374*** 
South Africa TAR 1.961 0.005 -0.287 10.624*** 16.637*** 
Tanzania TAR 11.465 -1.150 -0.034 35.219*** 64.707*** 
 
Notes. These estimates are based on the estimation of equations (5) and (6), or (6) and (7) for the TAR and 
MTAR models respectively. Γ  is the value of the threshold expressed as a percentage of the mean of the 
dependent variable across the study period. 
a Entries in this column are the F-statistics for the null hypothesis 021 == ρρ . ***, ** and * denote rejection 
of the null at the 1, 5 and 10% significance levels respectively. This test follows a non-standard distribution so 
the test statistics are compared with critical values reported by Enders and Dibooglu (2001): 9.94, 7.53 and 6.35 
for a sample size of n=100. 
b Entries in this column are conventional F-statistics.  
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Table 3. Error Correction Modelling with Asymmetric Adjustment 
 
11ρ  12ρ  21ρ  22ρ  31ρ  32ρ  
Cameroon -0.058 
(-1.381) 
-0.297*** 
(-4.103) 
-0.159 
(-1.100) 
-0.748*** 
(-3.023) 
0.015* 
(1.966) 
0.026** 
(2.024) 
Egypt -0.052 
(-0.734) 
-0.014 
(-0.953) 
1.177*** 
(5.027) 
0.083* 
(1.679) 
-1.024* 
(-1.932) 
0.005* 
(1.736) 
Ivory Coast -0.257*** 
(-3.592) 
-0.031 
(-0.752) 
0.393* 
(1.705) 
-0.047 
(-0.309) 
0.007 
(0.581) 
0.015* 
(1.919) 
Kenya -0.106* 
(-1.689) 
-0.033 
(-1.490) 
0.654*** 
(3.905) 
-0.017 
(-0.296) 
-0.011 
(-0.789) 
0.007 
(1.392) 
Morocco 0.087 
(1.544) 
-0.104*** 
(-2.633) 
-0.466** 
(-2.190) 
-0.314** 
(-2.104) 
0.024 
(1.077) 
0.010 
(0.632) 
Nigeria -0.033 
(-0.889) 
-0.040*** 
(-3.017) 
0.674*** 
(5.291) 
-0.077* 
(-1.711) 
0.000 
(0.067) 
0.001 
(0.499) 
South Africa -0.014 
(-1.408) 
-0.046** 
(-2.447) 
-0.118 
(-1.578) 
0.311** 
(2.278) 
-0.005 
(-1.011) 
-0.006 
(-0.623) 
Tanzania 0.064 
(-0.549) 
-0.059** 
(-2.056) 
1.790*** 
(12.122) 
-0.038 
(-1.036) 
-0.009 
(-0.839) 
-0.001 
(-0.207) 
 
Notes. Results for equations (8), (9) and (10) taken from the system of error correction equations presented in 
the text. These results exclude Botswana and Burundi for whom the null of non-cointegration was accepted 
using the tests for asymmetric cointegration in Table 2. ***, ** and * denote rejection of the null of a zero 
coefficient at the 1, 5 and 10% significance levels where the figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
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